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EAST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM VS. "MUTUAL ADVANTAGE" 
By Brigitte Schulz 
This paper will look at the political economy of relations between 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa. These relations have generated a considerable amount of interest 
in the West in the past decade, as the former Portuguese colonies of 
Angola and Mozambique gained their independence and opted for a close 
alliance with the socialist countries. Almost coinciding with these 
events, the ancient monarchy in Ethiopia was overthrown by a 
revolutionary movement which allied itself increasingly with the Soviet 
Union and its Eastern European allies. Relations between the GDR and 
these three African countries thus became particularly close, leading to 
a certain amount of hysteria in certain Western circles about the 
possibility of the entire "black continent" going "red." The GDR was seen 
by these observers to be a tool for spreading Soviet hegemonic ambitions 
to the African continent; i.e., a puppet carrying out the wishes of a 
stern master. 
The present paper does not follow in this interpretive tradition. 
Rather than seeking to locate the motives for East German policy behavior 
vis-a-vis the Third World in the Soviet Union, it examines the political 
and economic relations between the GDR and the Third World as a separate,, 
though not necessarily distinct, unit of analysis from that of the Soviet 
Union. In other words, it is assumed that the East German state has 
interests of its own in carrying out its Third World policies and that 
the study of these policies thus warrant merit independent of an 
examination of Soviet policies. This approach thus ties into similar 
studies on various East European countries conducted over the past few 
years which share a common conviction that Eastern Europe deserves to be 
studied separately from its dominant superpower, the Soviet Union.I 
The first section of the paper looks at the political factors shaping 
East German policies vis-a-vis the Third World. It considers the special 
circumstances of the GDR as a state, the theoretical underpinnings of 
relations with the Third World and the way its policy of "proletarian 
internationalism" is translated into concrete political actions. The 
second section examines the nature of the East German economy and the 
extent to which it influences economic relations with developing 
countries. It then turns to a concrete examination of the various types 
of economic interaction taking place with developing countries. The 
concluding section seeks to analyze the future of relations between 
sub-Saharan Africa and the GDR. It will also look critically at the 
contradictions between an East German political policy based on 
"proletarian internationalism" and an economic policy based on "mutual 
advantage." 
Political Relations 
Political relations between the GDR and the Third World have been 
influenced by several interrelated aspects: 1) the particular 
circumstances of the GDR as a state; 2) the closeness of its alliance 
with the Soviet Union; and 3) an interpretation of the world based on 
Marxism/Leninism and the necessary consequences deriving from this. 
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The "German Question." From its birth as a state in 1949, the GDR 
was considered "the other Germany" by most of the Western world, an 
illegitimate offspring whose arrival was neither celebrated nor welcomed. 
As most of Africa gained independence in the early 1960s, the GDR had not 
yet overcome the obstacles to normal relations with most of the world 
created by the West German government. Bonn's "Hallstein Doctrine" made 
the costs of recognizing East Germany extremely high. Should any Third 
World country grant the Berlin government such diplomatic recognition, 
the Bonn government would immediately rupture all political and economic 
ties with that country.2 Thus throughout the 1960s, Africa was little 
more than a battleground for the querelles allemandes, with the West 
German state emerging victorious in almost every instance. The GDR was 
restricted to relations with the few "radical nationalist" states of 
Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Tanzania and even these were limited mainly to 
bilateral trade and "solidarity" activities. 
In 1972,· with the ratification of the Basic Treaty which normalized 
relations between the two Germanies, the GDR's international status 
changed dramatically. Thirty-four African states established diplomatic 
relations with the GDR between May 1971 and May 1976 - the dates of the 
8th and 9th Congresses of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Since 1972 
open competition between the two German states in the Third World has 
decreased markedly. An element of tension remains, however, which can be 
directly attributed to the status of East Germany as as one part of a 
divided nation, with a population whose patterns of thought and 
consumption continue to be heavily influenced by the Western (capitalist) 
part of the the former Germany. This places a particularly heavy burden 
on policymakers in Berlin to show not only to the world but also to their 
own population the historically progressive and thus superior nature of 
socialism over capitalism. East German foreign policy thus has an 
important internal function and a victory for socialism in Africa is 
assumed to add to the legitimacy of socialism at home.3 
Relations with the Soviet Union. Close ties with the Soviet Union again 
reflect the particulart circumstances of East Germany's birth as a 
state. That part now constituting the GDR was assigned to the Soviet 
Union as its zone of occupation after World War II and became an 
independent state after the British and American zones had combined to 
become the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Union became the 
closest political and economic ally of the new socialist German state and 
the guarantor for its activities domestically and abroad. The GDR's 
geographic location made it an important country for Soviet security 
interests and both countries thus entered an alliance which has often in 
the past led Western observers to see East Germany merely as a "puppet" 
of the Moscow leadership, a notion which seems as superficial in 
analytical terms as it is appealing at the emotional level to many in the 
West. The scope of this essay does not permit a detailed analysis of 
Soviet/East German relations, but the situation is clearly more complex 
than a master-serant relationship. The leaders in both countries share a 
common world view based on Marxism/Leninism and the fates of both 
countries are closely linked due to a perceived common struggle against 
imperialism. Coordination of foreign policies is thus more than the 
Soviets simply telling the East Germans what to do; it it a policy 
coordination of allies pursuing basically the same global objectives.4 
The Marxist/Leninist theoretical underpinning. The closeness of the 
alliance with the Soviet Union has also affected the GDR's relations with 
the Third World, and its views on development are generally fashioned 
after the Soviet model. This includes an unquestioning acceptance - at 
least at the official level - of the Societ leadership position in the 
world revolutionary struggle. The Soviet Union, having been the first 
country to build successfully a socialist state,5 thus was the great 
force that set into motion a whole new historical epoch: that of the 
transition from capitalism to socialism/communism. Thus the importance 
of Lenin's achievements was not national, but global; they established a 
path which should be followed by all groups interested in establishing 
socialism in their own countries. In the task of building world 
socialism, there are three main groups which are united in an objective 
historical alliance; the socialist world community (with the Soviet Union 
at its head), the working classes inside the advanced capitalist 
countries, and the previously colonized world (the world of "national 
liberation"). To quote an East German official view of this: 
"As an inseperable link in the socialist community of states 
grouped around the USSR, the German Democratic Republic, in the 
creation of its relations with the nationally liberated 
countries of Asia and Africa, operates on the Leninist principle 
that the national liberation movement is a natural and objective 
ally of world socialism and the international working class in 
the struggle against imperialism and for social progress."6 
[authors's italics] 
This alliance between the Third World and the GDR is thus objective 
and not subject to the will of individual countries or heads of state; 
i.e., it is historically determined and thus inevitable. Temporary 
setbacks (such as the ones East Germany experienced in Ghana or Somalia) 
merely slow the pace of ultimate and inevitable victory over capitalism. 
The October Revolution and the existence of the world socialist 
system have made it possible for economically backward agrarian societies 
with almost non-existent proletariats to embark on building socialism 
without first going through the capitalist stage. Whereas Marx had 
argued that societies move through definite stages of development with 
capitalism becoming eventually replaced by socialism/communism, the 
existence of the world socialist system has made that capitalist step 
unnecessary because "socialism has become the determining force for 
global development."? 
Thus, the existence of the socialist countries in effect enables 
African and Asian countries to move straight in the direction of 
socialism, provided they maintain a close alliance with these socialist 
countries. Lenin had already postulated the need for this alliance as 
the crucial external component in this task of building socialism in a 
backward society. How closely allied a developing country is with the 
socialist countries is in fact an important gauge for the GDR to 
establish how "progressive" it is, often irrespective of how that country 




A "socialist orientation" inside the developing country is considered 
to have certain important internal components, such as the establishment 
of political organs able to affect political and economic transformations 
in the country, and the formation of progressive cadres and party 
organizations which will ultimately establish a Marxist/Leninist vanguard 
party, able to carry out the final task of building socialism,8 This 
socialist "orientation" is thus seen merely as a necessary and important 
precursor to the building of socialism itself, which at this initial 
stage involves changes mainly in the political superstructure. The 
African countries having embarked on this course9 are still considered 
to be part of the capitalist world system at the economic level and are 
in fact encouraged by the socialist states to continue in that position 
until they are in effect "ripe" enough to become full-fledged members of 
world socialism. One of the key areas in this precursory period is the 
strengthening of the state sector so that imperialism can be harnessed 
and increasing concessions gained from it for the building up of an 
independent national economy. As Brezhnev explained this process at the 
26th Party Conress of the CPSU: 
It is the gradual elimination of the position held by the 
imperialist monopolies, the indigenous bourgeoisie and 
feudal lords, as well as the limitation of the activities 
of foreign capital. This means to guarantee for the 
government of the people the commanding heights of the 
economy and to switch to the planned development of the 
productive forces and to stimulate the cooperative 
movement in the rural areas. This means to increase the 
role of the working masses in social life and to 
strenghten gradually the state apparatus through cadres 
working for the cause of the people. This means that the 
foreign policy of these countries should be anti-
imperialist in character, In these countries, the 
revolutionary parties are strengthened which express the 
interests of the large masses of workers,10 
The model thus advanced by the GDR, as by other socialist countries, 
is one which advocates the primacy of politics over economics. In other 
words, it is the building up of the state sector and the various mass 
organizations under its control which, under the guidance of a vanguard 
party, prepare for the eventual takeover of the entire economy. This key 
factor is often misunderstood by analysts in the West who show surprise 
at the fact, for example, that Angola's main economic partners after 
independence continued to be the capitalist countries of the West, 
despite a close political alliance with the East, This, however, is 
completely in line with the program advocated by the socialist countries, 
who now advocate a program for radical developing countries similar to 
the N,E,P. period in the Soviet Union in the twenties.11 
As Elizabeth Valkenier, among others, has pointed out, this approach 
of building socialism mainly at the superstructural level naturally leads 
to contradictions of its own. 12 In fact, it has also led to tensions 
with "progressive" Third World governments eager to rupture all ties with 
the imperialist West, such as Angola immediately after attaining its 
political independencen from Portugal, The Angolan government under 
Aghostino Neto was willing to rupture all ties with the West and 
immediately join the CMEA, but the countries already members of that 
organization were unwilling to pay the economic price of having another 
weak member join it. Mozambique's request for membership in the CMEA was 
turned down in 1981 and it has since joined the World Bank and the IMF in 
September 1984, and signed the Lome III convention with the European 
Community in spring 1985. Both Angola and Mozambique have only 
consultative status in the CMEA. The main commitment of the socialist 
countries to sub-Saharan Africa thus has been the establishment of 
appropriate political and social organizations able to carry out the ,task 
of socialist transformation at some future point. 
These priorities have naturally led to particularly close relations 
with those countries which have opted for the construction of "scientific 
socialism" as opposed to earlier variants of "African socialism." 
Relations with Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are thus especially 
close. Although there are certain differences in the way in which 
Ethiopia on the one hand and Mozambique and Angola on the other hand 
arrived at the juncture at which they chose a path of "socialist 
orientation" - Ethiopia represented an essentially anti-feudal and thus 
internal class struggle, while Angola and Mozambique fought to expel an 
external enemy - all have done so on the basis of "scientific 
socialism."13 This, along with the establishment of vanguard 
parties14 operating on the principles of democratic centralism, has 
meant a new quality in the GDR's political relations with them compared 
to its relations with the "radical" states of the 1960s such as Mali, 
Ghana, and Guinea. The new quality of these relations was given open 
expression in the ratification of friendship treaties with all three 
countries.15 
Since such a high priority is accorded by the GDR to the building up 
of various mass organizations which are instrumental for the construction 
of the East European model of socialism, it is important not to focus 
only on official state-to-state relations. Instead, the coordinated 
efforts of the various mass organizations in the GDR which work closely 
with corresponding organizations in the Third World must also be taken 
into account. Due to their special importance, three mass organizations 
in the GDR that work closely with developing countries will be discussed 
below briefly. They are the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ - Free German 
Youth), the Freier Deutscher Gewerschaftsbund (FDGB - Free German Trade 
Union Association), and the Verband der Journalisten (VDJ - Association 
of Journalists). Briefly discussed also will be the work of the East 
German Solidarity Committee, which largely coordinates the "solidarity" 
activities of the GDR. 
The Free German Youth (FDJ). Following Lenin's ideas on the 
importance of including the youths of a country in the process of 
building socialism and training them for the political leadership of 
tomorrow, youth organizations are considered vital in all socialist 
countries. The FDJ also plays an important part in the GDR's foreign 
policy by helping in the construction of socialism in developing 
countries. The FDJ operates a "Youth University" near the capital city 
of Berlin in which political cadres are schooled in revolutionary 
politics along the principles of the Soviet "comsomol" youth organization 
founded by Lenin. Along with young East Germans, about 150 young people 
from Third World countries are trained here annually in ten-month 
courses, and forty of them on average are from black Africa. The school 
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was opened only one year after World War II (on 22 May 1946) to train 
young Germans in scientific socialism and the experiences of the Soviet 
Union in building a socialist society; it began training cadres from 
foreign youth organizations in January 1958.16 Currently the 25th 
course is in progress at the school, which means that roughly 1,000 
students from sub-Saharan Africa have been trained so far in what the 
school describes as "Marxist/Leninist training and communist education" 
with the goal of "enabling the students to acquire Marxist/Leninist 
theory and to apply it creatively, to recognize fundamental social 
processes and links, and to develop practical solutions for the 
activities of the socialist youth organization."17 The school 
organizes an annual tribunal entitled "We Accuse Imperialism," at which 
students from Third World countries give personal testimony about the 
injustices committed by the imperialist countries, This obviously is a 
powerful way of allowing these young people to air their frustrations 
about the international status quo and to channel the critique squarely 
in the direction of the Western countries. The costs involved in 
training these foreign students are covered by the FDJ budget and 
consists of free room and board, plus roughly 400 Marks monthly as a 
stipend,18 
In addition to operating this school, since 1963 the FDJ has also 
assisted in the execution of foreign policy by dispatching so-called 
"brigades of friendship" to developing countries to set up vocational 
training centers, work as mechanics (mainly on GDR-supplied equipment), 
help in bringing in harvests (coffee in Angola, wheat in Ethiopia), and 
so on, At the end of 1983, there were thirteen brigades in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Of those, eight were in Angola, three in Mozambique, and one 
each on Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, The Guinean project has been ongoing 
since 1967 and the one in Bissau since 1976, Both of these are 
vocational training centers in which local apprentices learn specific 
trades. A similar center also exists in Mozambique and Angola. The 
other two brigades in Mozambique are involved in construction (mainly in 
connection with coal mining operations in Moatize), and the other seven 
brigades in Angola work in repair shops for GDR-model cars and trucks, 
In addition, each autumn a friendship brigade is sent on a special 
three-illonth assignment to Ethiopia to repair the East German farm 
equipment supplied to Ethiopian state farms. This brigade has been sent 
annually since 1978.19 
It is interesting that Western interpretations of these friendship 
brigades normally view them as paramilitary forces in Africa, This comes 
as no surprise, of course, considering the proclivity of many in the West 
to see any close levels of cooperation between the socialist countries 
and the Third World in military/strategic terms. This emphasis seems 
rather misplaced in the case of the friendship brigades, however, since, 
if anything, they resemble the US Peace Corps volunteers operating in the 
Third World, What distinguishes the East German youths, however, is that 
they are highly trained as mechanics and seem to be dispatched mainly to 
work on equipment sold by the GDR to their host country, If one needs to 
look for reasons beyond solidarity which sends these brigades to Africa, 
then they are clearly economic rather than military in nature. Since the 
East Germans lack international service networks to provide parts and 
services for their exports of industrial products, these friendship 
brigades perform this service function rather than any hidden military 
activities, 
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The Free German Association of Unions (FDGB). Another mass 
organization which naturally plays an important part in building 
socialism is the union. Union activity in a country in which the means of 
production have already been expropriated from the capitalist class is 
deemed different since the fundamental conflict between capital and labor 
has been resolved in favor of the latter. The work of the union (the FDGB 
is the only union in the GDR) is thus closely tied to the party as the 
ultimate decision-making institution in the country, and one of its main 
functions is to realize the plans established by the party. Part of its 
responsibility also is to work closely with developing countries in their 
struggle against imperialism, and the FDGB operates a trade union college 
in Bernau near Berlin to aid in that purpose. Since 1959, the FDGB has 
trained 3,300 unionists here from 85 different countries, with an 
emphasis on Africa. The unionists come to the GDR for courses varying 
from three to ten months, depending on their level of prior experience in 
the field. There are normally no more than fifteen students in one 
course and the school tries to assemble classes on the basis of similar 
linguistic or national backgrounds. For example, in January 1979, a 
special six;nonth course started for Mozambicans which was tailor-made 
for the needs of their country at that time, and in January 1982, another 
group of Mozambican unionists was trained in a three-month course. The 
training includes not only the fundamentals of trade union organizing 
within the context of a socialist society but also of Marxism/Leninism 
and the nature of the current struggle in the world. In this way, the 
GDR hopes to instill in visitors from Africa an understanding of the 
historical alliance between the developing and socialist countries in the 
struggle against imperialism. All expenses for the courses are covered 
by "solidarity contributions" of FDGB members, including a daily spending 
allowance of 7.50 Marks and a clothing allowance upon arrival. According 
to school officials, graduates from this union college are now located in 
just about all African states.20 
The Association of Journalists (VDJ). Since political propaganda 
(this is considered a legitimate activity and is not a pejorative term in 
the dictionary of the GDR) and agitation are also of primary importance 
in working with the masses, the VDJ's cooperation with colleagues from 
developing countries is yet another important tool of GDR foreign policy 
vis-ll-vis these countries. The "College of Solidarity" was founded in 
1963 by the VDJ to help young African states as part of East German 
anti-imperialist solidarity. It was financed by each of the roughly 
6,000 members contributing one day's wages to the school and even now is 
financed through membership fees. While in the beginning, students from 
developing countries were trained mainly in the fundamentals of 
"socialist" journalism, there has been an attempt in recent years to 
train people who already hold rather high positions in the journalistic 
establishments of their countries, since their political impact is 
potentially much larger. The basic ten-month introductory course is 
still held (in 1983 a group of fourteen Nicaraguans were trained in it) 
but there are now also many specialized courses lasting only about two 
months. From October to December 1983, for example, a course was 
conducted for radio and television journalists. Among the roughly twenty 
students in the course (most of them were from black Africa) were the 
heads of TV news rooms in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. The VDJ pays for the 
flights (in case this involves hard currency, the government assumes the 
cost), the room and board of students, plus a monthly allowance of 200 
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Marks and a one-time 500 Mark allowance in the beginning for warm 
clothing. The VDJ has also begun training journalists directly in their 
own countries at newly established journalist schools in Angola, 
Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Courses range from two to seven weeks and the 
VDJ sends experienced journalists and teachers from the GDR to handle the 
training. In this way, the GDR is able to have an immediate impact on 
the media in the developing countries involved.21 
The Solidarity Committee. One final extra-governmental tool of East 
German foreign policy which deserves mention because of its overall 
importance for relations with developing countries is the Solidarity 
Committee. It is the executive committee of all parties and mass 
organzations in the GDR (it has no members of its own) and mobilizes 
about 218 million Marks annually for the purpose of showing material 
solidarity with those involved in anti-imperialist struggles around the 
world. The organizaton was founded in 1960, a time when the GDR had 
gained diplomatic acceptance only by the other socialist countries and 
state-to-state relations with the rest of the world were largely 
non-existent. The Committee thus served an important function in 
establishing ties with African countries and liberation movements. 
Even now that the era of international ostracism is over, the 
Committee has maintained much of its importance. Through it, important 
links are maintained with various liberation movements. For example, both 
the ANC and SWAPO hold offices with diplomatic status in Berlin through 
accreditation by the Solidarity Committee. In addition, the Committee 
prints and mails out free of charge the periodicals put out by the ANC 
and SWAPO, Sechaba and Namibia Today, respectively. During the times of 
struggle by the MPLA and FRELIMO against the Portuguese, it offered vast 
amounts of material aid to these organizations, such as sending teachers 
to the FRELIMO school operating in Tanzania and providing the necessary 
school supplies, as well as flying wounded fighters back to the GDR for 
medical care. 
After one of these liberation movements has gained political 
independence, the emphasis shifts to shipments of '"solidarity goods'" to 
these countries as well as to train their cadres inside the GDR. 
According to an official from the Committee, at the beginning of 1984 it 
sponsored 37,000 youths from LDCs studying in the GDR, of whom 29,000 
received apprenticeships in specific trades and 8,000 university 
training.22 According to the same official, roughly half of all 
trainees are from sub-Saharan Africa. Although precise figures were not 
provided, due to the particularly close relations with Angola, 
Mozambique, and Ethiopia, it is safe to assume that the vast majority of 
them hail from those countries. Just to show how far-thinking the 
Committee is about these training programs in the GDR, it should be 
mentioned that over 200 SWAPO members have already been trained in East 
Germany in order to enable them to take over the presently all-white 
railroad system in Namibia after independence from South African rule. 
Although the Committee's official mission is to practise '"solidarity'" 
with the Third World, a close examination of its practises reveals that 
it also works in support of bilateral economic relations between the GDR 
and a developing country. Cooperation with the coal mines in Moatize, 
Mozambique serve as a good example of this, There, the East German mining 
firm "Schwarze Pumpe" entered into a commercial contract for the mining 
of coal, most of it to be exported to the GDR under the terms of a 
bilateral government agreement. The Solidarity Committee supported this 
cooperative venture by financing a camp for 350 miners and 150 
construction workers and an FDJ friendship brigade was dispatched to 
build the camp. The prefabricated parts for the houses were paid for by 
the Committee and sent from the GDR. In 1982, the Committee spent 
another six million Marks for the construction of a cultural center at 
Moatize. When problems developed in shipping the coal to the harbor, the 
Committee made a gift of forty-five trailers to house railroad workers 
along the railroad line and financed the dispatch of East German railroad 
engineers. The official designation of all of these activities on the 
part of the Committee was "solidarity," although the line between it and 
"mutual advantage", the East German label for its regular economic 
relations with other countries, here becomes very fine. Clearly the work 
of the Solidarity Committee is designed to turn solidarity relations of 
today into solid political as well as economic relations in the future. 
All of the activities described above by the various mass 
organizations are part of a coordinated East German policy vis-A-vis 
developing countries, with the Socialist Unity Party (SED) the ultimate 
instance of decision-making in the country, It is through the party that 
the overall goals and objectives of GDR foreign policy are formulated 
which are eventually executed by the various state and mass organizations 
in the country. A main function of all of the groups discussed thus 
becomes the dissemination and enforcement of decisions reached by the 
nation's highest ruling governing body, the SED, In other words, they are 
de facto a part of the governmental structure and operate inside the 
parameters set by the political leadership. Interactions between these 
groups and their respective counterparts in developing countries are thus 
not spontaneous expressions of partnership but rather a very carefully 
designed part of East German foreign policy vis-a-vis a particular 
country. The heads of these various mass organizations are also leading 
members of the SEo23 and through the organizational mechanism of 
democratic centralism party decisions are eventually carried out by these 
social organizations, This makes possible a unified East German approach 
to dealing with particular developing countries at any particular time. 
In addition, the foreign policy of the GDR vis-A-vis these countries 
is coordinated to a large extent with the other socialist countries at 
both the party and official government levels. In fact, Soviet foreign 
minister Gromyko has described the result of this coordination as a 
"diplomacy of socialism" which alone assures the continued foreign policy 
successes of the socialist countries.24 
At the political level then, relations with the developing countries 
take place through many different channels of cooperation. In 
ideological terms, they are claimed to be guided by the principles of 
proletarian internationalism in the joint struggle against imperialism. 
Socialist foreign policy is thus viewed as a "class policy" whose 
historic mission is to aid in the destruction of capitalism at the global 
level.ZS Because the GDR, like other socialist countries, portrays its 
foreign policies vis-A-vis the Third World in this fashion, many in the 
West assume that a natural harmony of interests exists between the 
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socialist countries in this regard. What a close examination of economic 
relations between the GDR and Third world countries reveals, however, is 
that this professed harmony quickly dissipates when confronted with the 
concrete economic needs of each of the countries involved. It is to these 
economic relations that we turn to next. 
Economic Relations 
Unlike its political relations, which are coordinated with other 
socialist countries as discussed in the previous section, economic 
relations between each CMEA country and individual LDCs are mainly 
bilateral in nature. Very little coordination takes place at the actual 
level which would allow for the execution of a unified "socialist 
economic policy." On the contrary, since each Eastern European country is 
committed to fulfilling its own national economic plans, competition 
between these countries for the markets and raw materials of the Third 
World sometimes is rather keen. 
There is agreement among the CMEA countries at the rhetorical level, 
however, that their economic relations with the developing countries are 
of a fundamentally different type from those characteristic of the Third 
World and the imperialist countries.26 Since the socialist and 
developing countries are thought to be bound by an objective historical 
alliance against imperialism, as discussed above, and since in the 
socialist countries there is no economic group "whose search for profits 
or export interests would contradict the interests of the peoples of Asia 
or Africa,"' the harmony of interests postulated at the political level is 
also claimed to exist in the economic sphere. Since exploitation of the 
Third World by the socialist countries is thus a priori impossible, the 
GDR categorically rejects any responsibility for the poverty prevailing 
in the Third World as well as a division of the world into "rich" and 
"poor" and vehemently supports the demands of the "Group of 77" for a new 
international economic order.27 
It is important to point out, however, that this position of 
solidarity with the Third World is beginning to erode, as events in these 
countries are forcing a reassessment of this theoretical alliance. 
Clearly, most developing countries have not opted for a non-capitalist 
road. In addition, the economic advances made by the so-called newly 
industrializing states have called into question the categoric assertion 
that developing countries could not improve their lot outside the 
socialist model. Thus, as Elizabeth Valkenier has shown in her excellent 
analysis of Soviet thinking on the Third World, for example, opinion in 
that country on the status and nature of the developing countries can no 
longer be said to be unified, and revolutionary hopes have given way to 
sober reflections about what is possible at this particular juncture in 
history.28 Similar doubts are emerging in the GDR, particularly in 
private discussions. At the level of official statements, various 
scholarly works, and the media, however, the Third World continues to be 
portrayed as on the road to socialism and closely allied with the GDR. 
The reasons for this ideologically "hard-line" approach would seem to lie 
in the particular circumstances of socialism in East Germany as discussed 
above, in which the leadership is under continuous pressure to prove to 
its population the historically "progressive" nature of its rule in 
distinction to that of the West German (capitalist) state. 
Before discussing economic relations between the GDR and developing 
countries, we need to examine the East German economy to understand how 
foreign economic relations are largely determined by internal needs. 
The GDR Economy. The GDR is a highly industrialized country in which 
by 1984 industry contributed 73 percent of the national income.29 It 
has a highly skilled workforce in which even almost all women participate 
fully in wage labor (over 60 percent of all production workers in the GDR 
are women and over 90 percent of all working-age women are in paid 
employment).30 Agriculture is highly mechanized and machines are used 
to harvest 100 percent of the grain, 97 percent of the potatoes and 94 
percent of the fodder, and the GDR is able to produce over 90 percent of 
its food requirements.31 
Two key factors influence the GDR's foreign economic relations: its 
high level of dependence on imported raw materials and a high level of 
dependence on the export of its industrial products. This degree of 
external dependence varies sectorally and "for a number of branches of 
the manufacturing industry (machine tools, printing machines, food stuffs 
and the packing industry, electrical engineering and electronics, 
instruments and the textile industry) exports and imports are a decisive 
production factor since their expansion depends on the further 
development of foreign trade."32 [Author's italics] 
The GDR exports roughly one-third of its total industrial production 
and imports over 60 percent of its industrial raw material requirements. 
Table 1 shows the structure of the GDR's exports and imports from 1960 to 
1979 by commodity groups, reflecting a high percentage of exports in 
finished products and imports in raw materials and fuels. The GDR is 
highly dependent on the import of tropical agricultural products such as 
coffee, tea, and spices. East Germans have among the highest levels of 
coffee consumption in the world, for example, and Angola and Ethiopia 
already are supplying roughly one third of the total coffee needs of the 
GDR. In terms of industrial raw materials, the GDR is dependent on 
foreign sources for 100 percent of its consumption of crude oil, iron 
ore, asbestos, titanium dioxide, and cotton, more than 80 percent in 
aluminum, 78 percent in tin and 52 percent in copper.31 133 Since 
the GDR does not publish detailed statistics on the origins and type of 
commodities imported, it is rather impossible to determine how much of 
these needs are satisfied through imports from Africa. 
The regional structure of the GDR's foreign trade shows its close 
ties with other CMEA countries, particularly the Soviet Union. While the 
socialist countries combined make up roughly 65 percent of the total 
foreign trade volume, the Soviet Union alone accounts for around 40 





Structure of Exports and Imports by 
Commodity Groups* 
(in percentages) 
Commodity Group 1960 1970 1975 1976 1977 197!! I9i9 
Exports 
Machines, equipment and 
means of transport 49.0 51.7 50.7 51.2 53.4 55.0 55.8 
Fuel, mineral raw 
materials, metals 15.7 10.1 12.1 11.3 11.2 10.1 11.8 
Other raw materials and 
semi-manufactures for 
industrial purposes, raw 
materials and products 
of the food industry 5.9 7.4 9.1 10.4 7.3 7.8 6.1 
Industrial consumer goods 15.1 20.2 15.6 14.4 15.3 15.0 14.9 
Chemical products, 
fertilizers, rubber 
building materials, and 
other goods 14.3 10.6 12.5 12.7 12.8 12.1 11.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Imports 
Machines, equipment 
and means of transport 12.7 34.2 30.8 31.5 33.3 34.0 33.1 
Fuel, mineral raw 
materials, metals 38.5 27.6 30.5 28.9 29.0 29.8 32.8 
Other raw materials and 
semi-manufactures for 
industrial purposes, raw 
materials and products 
of the food industry 39.2 28.1 22.6 24.9 22.0 20.8 19.4 
Industrial consumer goods 5.3 4.5 5.6 4.8 4.6 5.1 5.3 
Chemical products, 
fertilizers, rubber, 
building materials and 
other goods 4.3 5.6 10.5 9.9 11.1 10.3 9.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
* According to the uniform commodity nomenclature of foreign trade of cMEA 
member countries. 
Source: UNCTAD/TD/B/858, 18 August 1981, Annex, page 3 
13 
Table 2 
Regional Distribution of Foreign Trade 1975-1982 
(as percentage of total) 
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Developing 7.6 10.2 9.7 9.2 7.0 8.6 6.8 7.3 
countries 
Developed 22.4 24.0 27.4 27.0 29.0 30.5 29.5 23.9 
market 
economies 
Socialist 70.0 65.7 62.8 63.8 64.0 60.9 63.7 68.8 
countries 
Source: UNCTAD/TD/B/965, 1 September 1983, pp. 11-12. 
Traditionally, the Soviet Union has been the GDR's largest trading 
partner and has supplied the GDR with most of its raw materials needs. 
This, however, has not cushioned the GDR from the effects of the massive 
rise in the price of crude oil and other raw materials in the seventies. 
In 1975, the CMEA revised its price structure for raw materials to adjust 
the price annually on the basis of the world prices in the previous five 
years. Since the average price index for finished industrial products 
went up by only 230 percent between 1970 and 1978 compared to 556 percent 
for mineral raw materials, the terms of trade for the GDR vis-A-vis the 
Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly during this time period.34 For 
example, while in 1970 the GDR was able to finance its oil imports from 
the Soviet Union with only 8 percent of its exports to that country, by 
1982 roughly one-third of its exports to the USSR were needed to finance 
oil imports alone.35 Erich Honecker acknowledged these changed 
circumstances when he told the eleventh plenary session of the central 
committee of the SED in 1979 that "the share of machines and equipment in 
our exports needed to pay for oil imports has more than tripled since 
1970."36 This led to a massive accumulation of debts to the Soviet 
Union, which from 1975 to December 1980 were estimated at ten billion 
Marks37 and by 1984 reached the accumulated total of 17 billion Marks, 
according to the Institute for Economic Research located in West 
Berlin.38 
Much like in other Eastern European countries, the GDR leadership had 
projected the 1970s as the decade in which a massive modernization of the 
technological base of industry via imported (Western) technology paid for 
by credits from the West would take place. With this modernization in 
place during the first half of the decade and industrial goods now more 
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competitive on the markets of the advanced capitalist countries, 
increased exports to the West would provide the funds to repay these 
debts. These ambitious plans were not realized inside the country, 
however, and the deep recession in the capitalist countries coupled with 
increased sanctions and trade barriers imposed by Western governments on 
goods from Eastern Europe drastically decreased sales opportunities. 
Thus by the end of 1980, debts to Western banks amounted to $7.4 billion, 
with an additional $3.9 billion owed in trade with the Federal Republic 
of Germany (so-called inter-German trade).39 In 1983, the GDR was able 
to reduce its hard-currency debts to Western banks to $6.7 billion, with 
repayment amounts scheduled for 1984 estimated at another $2 billion. 
Meanwhile, projections for 1984 trade with the Soviet Union show this to 
be the first year in a long time that the GDR achieved a positive trade 
balance with the Soviet Union.40 
These developments were made possible by certain forced changes in 
the foreign economic strategy of the GDR in the 1981-85 plan. They 
essentially amounted to (1) a dramatic increase in exports, even at the 
expense of domestic consumption in certain products; (2) an increase of 
hard-currency sales to LDCs and the aggressive opening up of sales 
markets, particularly of complete plants, to these countries; (3) 
replacing hard-currency imports such as grain from the United States with 
barter trade involving LDCs, and reducing imports from NATO countries to 
products which cannot be gotten on any other market, mainly high 
technology and industrialized goods. Hard currency earnings became even 
more important to foreign economic transactions than previously in order 
to be able to repay the extensive debts to the West. Table 2 above 
reflects how this policy translated into a shift in the regional 
distribution of East Germany's foreign trade. The following table shows 
how this has affected trade with the developing countries. 
Table 3 
Foreign Trade with Developing Countries, 
I96D-19B3 
(in million US $) 
1960 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Imports 90 182 1,288 n2 965 1,000 
Exports 89 183 1,356 1,268 1,797 1,700 
Source: CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, September 1983 and 
September 1984, quoted in: Robin Remington, "The East European 
Bloc and the Third World: Interests, Capabilities, Objectives." 
Paper presented at the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., February 
1985. 
Economic relations with developing countries. Having outlined the 
nature of the East German economy and the difficulties which it has faced 
during the past decade, we will now look at economic relations with 
developing countries. The GDR includes under the rubric of economic 
relations with developing countries not only trade but also scientific 
and technical cooperation. These relations are carried out almost 
exclusively on a bilateral basis between the GDR and the respective 
"partner" and are claimed by the GDR to operate on the basis of "mutual 
advantage. "'tl Bilateral trade takes up the major share of these 
economic relations, although the component of scientific and technical 
cooperation is growing. Included in the latter category are: 
l)the exchange of scientific information, technological know-how, 
and scientific or technical expertise; 
2)joint projects at research institutions; 
3)assistance in education and training; 
4)sending experts and scientists; and 
5)the transfer of licenses. 
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Discussed first will be bilateral trade, followed by more complex forms 
of economic cooperation such as compensation agreements and tripartite 
cooperation. Finally, scientific and technical cooperation will be 
analyzed, since the GDR counts these among its economic relations with 
LDCs. 
(1) Bilateral trade. Traditionally, trade has been the main 
instrument of economic interaction with developing countries and is 
claimed by the GDR to constitute an important element of its "aid" 
relations with these countries as well. The GDR has a marked trade 
emphasis on only a few developing countries, many of which are important 
trading partners for Western countries also. For example, in 1980 73 
percent of all GDR exports to the Third World went to only fifteen LDCs: 
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, Brazil, Columbia, 
Argentina, Mexico, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. Angola, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia alone accounted for 15.9 percent of trade within 
that group, while the oil-exporting countries of Algeria, Iraq, Iran, 
Libya and Nigeria accounted for almost half, clearly because of their 
considerable internal markets and also because of their oil exports to 
the GDR. Most developing countries appear to be of little economic 
interest to the GDR, particularly the resource-poor least developed 
ones.43 The following table shows the trade volume with the major 




Volume of Foreign Trade with Major Partners in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, l965-l982 
(in million Valuta-Marks and current prices) 
1960 l965 l970 l975 1980 l982 
Angola 275.0 264.3 
PR Congo 2.8 0.2 0.3 O.l 3.6 28.6 
Ethiopia 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 132.3 l29.l 
Ghana 7.0 53.0 2.2 l3.7 49.5 74.7 
Mozambique 274.5 4ll.8 
Nigeria 0.9 l3.4 l2.9 3.3 47.5 l37 .9 
Sudan ll.l 9.9 25.0 33.3 26.7 l6.0 
Tanzania 2.0 6.6 6.3 49.l 2.6 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the GDR, l980 and l983 
What is striking about the figures in table 4 above is how quickly the 
countries with a "socialist orientation" have become the main trading 
partners in sub-Saharan Africa. Relations with these countries are 
clearly assuming a more important position than those with the "radical" 
states of the sixties - Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania. Guinea, 
despite its close alliance with the socialist countries throughout the 
sixties and seventies, never became an important trading partner. Neither 
did Mali. Likewise Tanzania's trade relations with the GDR never reached 
any sizeable proportions. The PR Congo, with which the GDR enjoys 
excellent political relations, also does not figure prominently in East 
Germany's foreign trade. On the other hand, relations with Nigeria, which 
is clearly not committed to a non-capitalist development path, are on the 
rise. This is not surprising, of course, considering that country's large 
internal market for industrial goods and, at least until recently, its 
availability of hard currency earned through the sale of crude oil. Trade 
with all other sub-Saharan African countries is just about non-existent. 
It is impossible to determine from East German statistics how much of 
the foreign trade conducted constitutes either imports or exports, as 
statistical yearbooks published by the GDR after 1975 give only aggregate 
foreign trade volumes. Thus is is virtually imposssible to determine 
negative or positive trade balances with sub-Saharan Africa, or indeed 
with any other region of the world, by looking at East German sources. 
The following table shows East German trade with Africa as compiled by 
the United Nations, using data provided by the GDR's trading partners. 
Table 5 
Trade with Africa, 1970-1983 
(in million US$) 
Imports Exports 
1970 52 60 
1975 124 172 
1980 D7 181 
1981 185 236 
1982 20 121 
1983 24 259 
Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, July 1984. 
What is striking about the figures in table 5 is that imports from 
Africa fell radically in 1982 and 1983. This would fit neatly into the 
economic strategy of the 1981-85 plan which called for drastic reductions 
in imports as discussed earlier. If one compares the figures for Africa 
with those for all of the developing countries as shown in table 3 above, 
the reduction of imports is even more severe than that from all LDCs 
combined. One of the problems in trying to assess this situation is that 
the data on which table 5 is based includes the entire African continent, 
including such traditional North African trading partners of the GDR as 
Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. Data for Mozambique, for example, which is the 
GDR's main trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, is not available for 
almost the entire past decade, and it is thus impossible to tell from 
either East German or any other available sources the amount of imports 
and exports undertaken between these two countries. Statistics are 
available through the United Nations on GDR trade with Ethiopia, and 
Table 6 shows the breakdown of that trade. 
Table 6 
Trade with Ethiopia, 1970-1982 
























The data provided by Ethiopia does not confirm the radical drop in 
imports shown for all of Africa. One would assume that one reason for 
this lies in the regulated bilateral trade agreements through which the 
GDR commits itself to regular purchases from Ethiopia. In terms of 
imports from Angola and Mozambique, the other two main partners of the 
GDR in sub-Saharan Africa, no data is available. Even if a reduction in 
imports from Mozambique had taken place over the past few years, however, 
this would not necessarily prove an East German unwillingness to purchase 
more of that country's products. The economic situation in Mozambique has 
deteriorated so severely in the eighties that it is hard to imagine the 
GDR, or any other country, being able to import much from it. Since the 
GDR unfortunately does not reveal information concerning the compositon 
of its foreign trade, all of these matters ultimately become a matter of 
speculation and thus extremely limited in their utility to facilitate 
understanding. 
Based on the evidence available it thus seems reasonable to assume 
that the GDR in fact enjoys a considerable trade surplus with sub-Saharan 
Africa. Too little information is available on the conditions of this 
trade to determine conclusively, however, whether the GDR is using this 
surplus to balance its hard currency commitments to the West. Istvan 
Dobozi, an economist at Hungary's World Economics Institute, argues that 
this is in fact the economic strategy pursued by the East European 
countries.44 Money made in the developing countries is thus spent in 
the West rather than on purchases from the South. 
The structure of trade between the GDR and its trading partners in 
the Third World shows the usual pattern between a highly industrialized 
country and LDCs. At the begining of the eighties, finished products 
constituted over 90 percent of the exports of the GDR to that region, 
while over 80 percent of all imports were agricultural products plus oil 
and raw materials of all types.45 Here again, however, due to the lack 
of detailed information from the GDR, much is left to speculation. In the 
summer of 1984, a GDR publication maintained that at that point "roughly" 
40 percent of imports from developing countries were in the form of 
semi-finished or finished products, compared to 24 percent in 1973.46 
Trusting these figures from the GDR essentially amounts to a matter of 
faith, however, because no data is published that would substantiate the 
claim. In terms of trade with sub-Saharan Africa, the structure of trade 
is of a very traditional type in any case, since the productive forces 
there are so underdeveloped that the export of finished products is not a 
primary concern for that continent at this time. 
In seeking to locate the impetus behind the GDR's foreign trade 
relations, the traditional argument to explain the need for this trade 
has been the need to "create conditions for the steady purchase from 
these countries of such products as crude oil, cotton, cotton fabrics, 
protein fodder, vegetable oil, coffee, cocoa and tropical fruits."47 
The very high dependence of the East German economy on these products as 
discussed earlier, is certainly a fact. Since overall energy 
self-sufficiency in the CMEA is going down and the Soviets are also 
seeking to diversify their exports to earn more hard currency themselves, 
GDR imports from non-CMEA sources will become correspondingly more 
important in the decades to come.48 Thus raw materials from Africa 
will play an even greater role for the GDR in the years ahead. 
The need to pay for these imports with East German products is not 
the only, nor necessarily the most important reason, however. In fact, it 
is argued here that these markets are important to the GDR in any case 
because of the need to sell its industrial goods. The LDCs provide a 
market for East German goods which would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to sell in another part of the world. This is so because the industrial 
products manufactured in the GDR with few exceptions do not meet the 
international technical standards to make them competitive in the West. 
Thus the Third World offers a market for socialist countries in "capital 
goods and manufactured consumer goods which they could not sell in the 
advanced capitalist countries because of their low competitiveness. It is 
well known that the great majority of capital goods exported to 
non-socialist markets go to developing countries and, in particular, to 
the African countries."49 Despite past attempts at integration within 
the East European economies, they essentially remain similar rather than 
complementary in structure and thus offer few opportunities for exporting 
industrial products to one another. Since the GDR has only a limited 
internal market for its industrial goods and the CMEA market does not 
absorb all of the industrial goods produced, the importance of the 
African markets is certainly not insignificant and, it is argued here, is 
growing. 
Until a few years ago, the primary mechanism for regulating trade 
with the LDCs was through clearing agreements, which essentially amounted 
to barter trade, enabling both trading partners to avoid hard currency 
transactions, Such trade on a clearing basis takes place at present with 
Mozambique, for example, through which the GDR is able to import tea, 
sisal, cashew-nuts, citrus fruits, and bananas without paying for them in 
hard currency. In turn, it sends to Mozambique finished products such as 
electrical household equipment, canned goods, clothing, and soap. This 
does not mean, however, that the entire trade between Mozambique and the 
GDR takes place on a clearing basis, As Schoeller has pointed out, items 
placed on the clearing list tend to be of inferior quality on both sides 
because any items in demand on hard currency markets will not be traded 
on barter terms by either country if at all possible, Thus both 
countries benefit by getting rid of items which they would not have been 
able to sell on the international market, such as third-grade Mozambican 
tea for technologically inferior finished products from the GDR.50 
Investment and capital goods are normally not supplied by clearing but 
rather on the basis of credits repayable in hard currency. Because of 
the deteriorating economic situation in Mozambique, East Germany has 
recently been forced to accept goods such as citrus fruits and tea in 
repayment for deliveries of W-50 trucks because of Mozambique's 
incapacity to repay in hard currency as had been previously agreed,51 
The volume of trade is regulated by trade agreements signed annually 
by the GDR and its partner countries in the developing world, By 1984, 
the GDR had ratified bilateral trade agreements with sixty-three 
developing countries and worked in regular economic commissions with 
fifteen of them,52 For example, on 24 March 1984 the new trade 
agreement signed between the GDR and Ethiopia (and announced on Radio 
Addis Ababa) stipulated that the GDR provide Ethiopia with tractors, 
mopeds, motor vehicles, spare parts, agricultural machinery and various 
other equipment in exchange for coffee, skins, oil fruits, grain, 
T-shirts, underwear, and wine,53 Trade agreements also regulate the 
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trade with Angola and Mozambique, and special joint commissions meet 
annually to work out the trade for the following year. The prices 
established for this trade are based on current world market prices, 
although competition sometimes drives down the price of certain goods 
just as it does in trade between Western countries and LDCs. For the GDR 
this means competing not only with Western firms but also with fellow 
CMEA countries equally eager to sell their goods on these markets. 
It should be pointed out, however, that it is almost impossible to 
determine the exact prices agreed upon by the GDR and its respective 
partners, since this information is considered secret and thus not 
published in any available East German source. One suspects that one 
reason for the GDR's insistence on secrecy lies in that fact that it does 
not want to give critics a chance to admonish it for using prices set on 
the imperialist world market, prices which the GDR insisted until 
recently served as a vehicle of resource extraction from the Third World 
on the part of the capitalist countries.54 The logic that·this 
exploitation is somehow nonexistent when practised by a socialist country 
naturally escapes many and the GDR's habit of not making prices public 
only enhances the suspicions of many observers. 
It is this practise of trading with the developing countries on the 
basis of world market prices which has been a source of irritation 
between the East European countries and their friends in the South. As 
early as 1964, Che Guevara, addressing the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in 
Algiers, criticized the socialist countries for exploiting the 
underdeveloped countries through unequal exchange just as the imperialist 
countries were doing, since both trade at prices set by capitalist 
monopolies.55 Too little is known to make a precise evaluation of this 
accusation in regard to the GDR's trade with sub-Saharan Africa, but, as 
Andre Gunder Frank has pointed out, "what experience does show is that 
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe stick to business and drive as 
hard a bargain in international trade as anybody else."56 
If in fact the GDR trades with sub-Saharan Africa on the basis of 
world market prices, then African countries have experienced the same 
deterioration of the terms of trade for their primary commodities as they 
have through trading with advanced capitalist countries. The prices for 
raw materials (with the exception of oil) are the lowest they have been 
in forty years in real terms, and between 1977 and 1981, the terms of 
trade for African developing countries have gone done by 50 percent.57 
The African countries ex~orting coffee, copper, cocoa, bananas, vegetable 
oils and tea alone lost $2.2 billion between 1979 and 1981 due to the 
deteriorating terms of trade.58 It thus seems totally unconvincing 
when the socialist countries maintain that "there is no general problem 
in the exchanges between developed and developing countries ••• Socialist 
countries, in distinction to the imperialist ones, share no 
responsibility for the economic situation in developing countries and in 
that sense have no obligation toward them."59 If the structure of 
trade is very similar to that between capitalist industrial countries and 
LDCs, and the prices underlying the sales transactions likewise do not 
differ from those with capitalist countries, it is difficult to accept 
the logic advanced by the GDR that trading with it is a priori more 
beneficial for a developing country than trading with any capitalist 
enterprise. 
Nor does it look like trade relations between the GDR and LDCs, 
including Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, will change drastically in the 
decade to come, Dobozi and Inotai have projected a commodity composition 
between the CMEA countries and LDCs to 1990 to be roughly the same as at 
present,60 and an analysis of the types of long-term economic 
agreements ratified between the GDR and Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia 
over the past years confirms this projection, The pattern of trade 
between the GDR and LDCs of whatever political variety thus does little 
to alter existing divisions of labor but merely shifts the geographical 
distribution of this trade from one part of the world to another, But, 
as Deepak Nayyar has pointed out, "such traditional patterns of trade can 
neither transform the structure of production in the South nor make for a 
new international division of labor,"61 
Although bilateral trade is by far the most important type of 
transaction in economic relations with the developing countries, the GDR, 
has been trying to increase its share of more complex forms of 
cooperation in order to integrate these countries into a "socialist 
division of labor," Included in this "promotion of mutual 
complementarity"62 are joint ventures on the basis of compensation 
agreements which basically guarantee developing countries a market for 
their export-oriented industrial or agricultural projects. 
(2) Compensation agreements, In this form of economic cooperation, 
the GDR generally provides the experts and the necessary industrial 
equipment for which it gets compensated in future production from the 
investment project. The East German involvement in the coal-mining 
operations in Mozambique is an example of this type of arrangement, in 
which the GDR will receive much of the coal mined at Moatize in return 
for the material and technical assistance it rendered there, Mozambican 
tantalum mining is another example of this type of arrangement: the GDR 
supplies the investment goods plus the experts in exchange for the 
exclusive right to this tantalum, with the option to resell it on 
hard-currency markets. The mines themselves, however, stay in the 
possession of the Mozambican state and do not themselves become the 
property of the GDR,63 One further example of this type of 
transaction, which is also one of the few cases of multilateral 
cooperation within the CMEA in developing countries, is the textile plant 
in Kombolcha, Ethiopia, built jointly by the GDR and the CSSR. While 
Ethiopia presently exports raw cotton, the operation of this plant will 
enable it to export cotton fabrics to the GDR from this plant in the 
future,51 
(3) Tripartite cooperation. In this economic undertaking, which is 
growing in importance, socialist countries and Western firms cooperate in 
an LDC, with the role of the developing countries mainly limited to being 
the "purchasers of goods and services jointly provided by enterprises in 
the East and West."64 While East German policy-makers appear to have 
had some ideological misgivings about this type of cooperation in the 
past, these seem now to have been abandoned in light of the increased 
business opportunities in the Third World which this offers. The 
projects underway on this basis in which the GDR was taking part in 
mid-1984 were twice the total number of those completed in all previous 
years,65 Past examples of this type of cooperation include the 
establishment of a textile plant in Mozambique, in which the GDR 
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cooperated with the Italian firm Snamprogetti,66 and the erection of a 
cotton-spinning facility in Ethiopia. In 1977, the East German 
enterprise "Unitechna-Textimaprojekt" and West Germany's Krupp 
steel-exporting works decided to cooperate in the construction of this 
Ethiopian plant. While Krupp initially had charge of the overall 
management function, this changed after the Ethiopian government moved 
closer to the GDR, and the East German firm supervised the completion of 
the project in 1981.67 
Both compensation and tripartite cooperation agreements are praised 
by the GDR as contributing to the "development" of their African partners 
and as presenting real alternatives to the traditional North-South 
economic transactions. The evidence is not as unambiguous, however. For 
example, what does it mean for the Mozambican state to retain ownership 
of its tantalum mines if the East Germans have the exclusive rights to 
mine the tantalum and to sell it on the international market for hard 
currency? In what way does this differ from Western forms of economic 
interaction, except in rhetoric? The reality is that the Mozambicans have 
relinguished their rights to a natural resource in their country to a 
foreign power, be it a foreign government or a foreign company. The net 
effect of this type of an economic arrangement may be beneficial in the 
short and/or long term for both parties. However, one fails to see how 
this relationship differs in fundamentals from a situation in which a 
foreign capitalist firm takes over the management functions of a 
state-owned enterprise in the Third World and markets the product. The 
only difference would seem to lie in the specific financial arrangements 
that were agreed upon and not in the 'nature' of the relationship itself. 
Likewise, the increasing trend toward tripartite economic 
cooperation does little to clarify the differences emphasized in GDR 
literature between East and West in the South. To argue that projects 
jointly undertaken by an Eastern and Western enterprise somehow become 
more beneficial for the developing country involved is again more a 
matter of faith than any real evidence. It also casts some doubt on the 
GDR's categoric assertion that multinational corporations do not aid in 
the development of the Third World but merely operate there to maximize 
their profit opportunities. If this is so, how does the investment 
undertaken jointly between East and West become different in its impact 
on the South, just because one side calls itself socialist? Did the 
nature of the cotton-spinning plant in Ethiopia change because the 
construction of it switched from West to East German hands? It is these 
kinds of questions to which the GDR will be increasingly subjected as it 
intensifies tripartiate cooperative ventures in the developing countries. 
(4) Scientific and technical cooperation. The main emphasis here is 
on the training of personnel from, and sending of experts to, the 
developing countries. It is in this type of cooperation that the GDR's 
operations in the developing countries differ the most from the West and 
make a real contribution toward the improvement of conditions in the 
South. Cooperation in this sphere, like all other types of economic 
transaction, are regulated on the basis of bilateral government 
agreements. For example, the first such agreement signed with Mozambique 
on 13 August 1975 included: (a) the dispatch of GDR experts and 
specialists to Mozambique, (b) the acceptance of Mozambicas for 
vocational training in F.ast German firms and institutions, and (c) the 
training of leading Mozambican cadres in special courses and symposia in 
the GDR in various subject areas.68 While this initial agreement 
stipulated that GDR experts be paid in local Mozambican currency, 
according to Moeller the GDR now increasingly seeks payments in hard 
currency for these expert services due to its own economic situation.69 
Cooperation in the field of expert services and apprenticeship 
training normally closely complements commercial relations between the 
GDR and developing countries. In Africa, over 80 percent of all GDR 
experts are in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, the countries which are 
also its main customers in the sub-Saharan part of that continent. The 
sending of experts and training of cadres normally is part of a sales 
transaction of GDR machines and equipment on these countries. For 
example, the commercial agreement with the East German enterprise 
"Schwarze Pumpe" to help in the operation of the coal mine in Moatize was 
accompanied by the sending of GDR experts under the scientific and 
technical cooperation agreement between the GDR and Mozambique. Since 
one of the main export items of the GDR is complete plants (turnkey or 
product-in-hand) and this is an area in which international competition 
is particularly keen, East Germans consider the training programs which 
they can offer in conjunction with the sale of such plants as a real 
competitive advantage over capitalist firms.70 
The training at both the vocational and university levels inside the 
GDR is an important element of cooperation in the scientific and 
technical sphere. At present, about 9,000 foreign citizens study at East 
German universities and thousands more receive technical training through 
apprenticeship programs. In 1982, 4,222 completed their vocational 
training, bringing the total number of graduates from LDCs since 1970 to 
more than 54,000. In 1982 also, 1,435 students from developing countries 
graduated from East German universities, bringing their total number 
since 1970 to about 14,500.71 Between 1977 and 1982, more than 400 
Ethiopians alone were trained at East German universities.72 
A word of caution about these figures seems in order, however. 
Figures abound in East German literature about the number of foreigners 
being trained in the country, and they are normally presented as part of 
the GDR's active solidarity with the South. However, some of the young 
people studying in the GDR are there on a regular commercial basis, with 
their home country paying their tuition expenses as well as providing the 
students with a monthly stipend. In these cases, the East German 
government accepts the payments in hard currency and gives the students a 
monthly stipend in its own non-convertible currency. This would thus 
appear to be more of a straight-forward economic transaction certainly 
also working to the advantage of the GDR than an act of "solidarity." For 
example, a large contingent of Libyans is in the GDR receiving vocational 
training on this basis. The author also met several students from 
sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Zambia and Zimbabwe) who were studying in the 
country under such terms. 
Thus it is often difficult to determine the precise nature of the 
relationships existing between the GDR and developing countries in this 
regard. Frequently they are presented as part of scientific and technical 
cooperation (which is thus part of overall economic relations), and 
simultaneously praised as part of the GDR's "aid" efforts within the 
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context of solidarity activities. Thus it is often impossible to tell 
precisely under what terms these young people are trained in the GDR. One 
can say in overall terms, however, that these training programs 
constitute a major part of the interaction between the GDR and 
sub-Saharan Africa. They clearly make a real contribution toward the 
needs of that continent by building the human infrastructure necessary 
for subsequent economic development. The GDR is clearly justified in 
pointing with pride to these programs and their importance cannot be 
underestimated. Although the East Germans do not spend as much money on 
these "aid" programs as Western countries spend on so-called official 
development assistance, a comparison of monetary spending would never be 
able to do justice to the real impact which these training programs 
have. 73 
The cooperation in the agricultural sector deserves a few comments 
because of the enormous importance this sector has in the economies of 
developing countries. Cooperation here is mainly in the area of 
promoting cooperatives and state farms, The GDR supplies agricultural 
equipment, fertilizers, and experts in exchange for agricultural 
products. In Mozambique, for example, a project for growing grain crops 
over a total area of 120,000 ha in three Mozambique provinces is being 
planned, with the largest project in Manica Province in the center of the 
country with a total area of 80,000 ha,74 In Niassa Province, 1,000 ha 
of corn are being planted with GDR assisstance, including tractors from 
Schonebeck,75 Between 1978 and spring 1984, the GDR exported 
agricultural equipment to Ethiopia totalling 90 million Marks, including 
1,850 tractors, 285 harvest combines, 300 drilling machines and over 100 
other agricultural machines.76 The Ethiopian government plans to open 
up 300,000 ha of new land to agriculture by 1994 and GDR agricultural 
machines and equipment will play a prominent part in this venture if past 
experience is a guide. The 200,000 ha of new agricultural land opened up 
so far have been accomplished almost exclusively with tractors and 
ploughs from the GDR, In the Highlands of Ethiopia, on Garadella state 
farm, about 900,000 tons of grain were harvested last October for the 
sixth time with the help of "Fortschritt" harvesting combines serviced by 
the FDJ friendship brigade.77 
As events in Mozambique over the past few years have shown, however, 
this East German agricultural model based on the use of machines and 
cooperative farming on large state farms is not necessarily applicable to 
the conditions prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa. Even today, most African 
peasants produce mainly for their own subsistence, while in Eastern 
Europe commodity production was generalized even at the rural village 
level at the beginning of this century, In Angola and Mozambique for 
example, many peasants who had been forced through the coercive mechanism 
of colonialism to work on large plantations returned to subsistence 
farming in their own villages once that coercion ended and it has been 
difficult to get them to return to work on the state farms, many of which 
were the colonial plantations from before, In Ethiopia even today around 
90 percent of the working population is involved mainly in subsistence 
agriculture and only 20 percent of the harvests actually reach the 
market.78 In Angola in 1979, about 80 percent of the population mainly 
lived off subsistence agriculture,79 and in Mozambique at the time of 
independence, only around 30 percent of the population was involved in 
wage labor, while 80 percent of the population was involved in the 
agricultural sector.780 Even in Cuba, the country which often serves as 
the model of successful socialist development in the Third World, at the 
time of its revolution, 64 percent of all people involved in agriculture 
were wage laborers on big estates and another 30 percent were small-hold 
tenants or owners involved in commodity production. In addition, the 
rate of urbanization in Cuba in 1953 was 57 percent of the 
population.Bl Thus, in addition to economies distorted to meet foreign 
needs, Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia have to take into account 
populations that as a whole are still far removed from their "homo 
economicus" counterparts in both East and West. 
In addition, this model overlooks certain key sociological factors 
in Africa which were brought up again recently at an FAO conference in 
Zimbabwe: most agricultural work in Africa is performed by women and most 
Africans still live in extended family settings.82 This is not to say 
that women cannot be taught to operate tractors and other big 
agricultural equipment, nor that extended families cannot also be 
incorporated into rural cooperatives. It is argued, however, that any 
successful rural development strategy in Africa must take these factors 
into account. The simple transfer of models which does not take into 
consideration these real sociological differences does not necessarily 
bring "development." The negative experiences made on Mozambican state 
farms in recent years, for example, have shown that establishing such an 
operation takes more than importing a few experts and tractors from the 
GDR. FRELIMO basically admitted this at its Fourth Party Congress in 
1983, arguing self-critically that the agricultural model which it 
pursued after independence was doomed to failure because it sought to 
emulate Eastern Europe and thus failed to take account of the specific 
conditions prevailing in the country at that time.83 
The largest difficulty for the construction of socialism in 
sub-Saharan Africa might prove to be, however, that they are attempting 
to build socialism while remaining embedded in the capitalist world 
economy. The dual model advanced by the GDR of building socialism at the 
superstructural level while gradually gaining concessions from 
imperialism seems fraught with contraditions. The logic of this model 
assumes that imperialism is equally interested in all developing 
countries and that the latter have considerable leverage over the 
interests of foreign capital. Yet the situation in Mozambique, for 
example, has shown that the power of a very poor and economically 
backward country to harness imperialism for its own advantage is actually 
extremely limited. Imperialism simply goes elsewhere if the conditions 
imposed on it by a "progressive" country are not to its liking. Even the 
signing of the Nkomati accord with South Africa in early 1984 did not 
bring the foreign investors the FRELIMO government had hoped for. The 
CMEA countries, on the other hand, have shown themselves unable to fill 
the gap economically and, like the GDR, have pursued a strategy of 
"mutual self-interst" in dealing with that country. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
East German foreign policy, like that of any other nation state, is 
a complex web of factors conditioned not only by domestic needs but also 
an external environment which acts either to constrain or aid in the 
execution of national goals. Thus the GDR's relations with sub-Saharan 
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Africa during the past quarter of a century have been the result both of 
the specific conditions prevailing in the GDR, in sub-Saharan Africa, as 
well as the global system as a whole, 
Until the early seventies, the GDR's relations with the rest of the 
world were largely conditioned by the country's lack of diplomatic 
recognition outside of the Warsaw Pact area, This, as Michael Sadaro has 
phrased it, put the GDR into the position of "supplicant," making the 
search for diplomatic recognition the cornerstone of its foreign policy 
vis-a-vis the non-socialist world, 84 Thus the Deutschlandfrage as 
discussed above was the primary determinant of the GDR's relations with 
sub-Saharan Africa during the immediate post-independence periof of the 
early sixties. Since no formal diplomatic ties were established even with 
the "progressive" states of that era such as Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 
relations focused mainly on the establishment of bilateral trade as well 
as on "solidarity," It was during this era that the Solidarity Committee 
was of enormous importance in the execution of foreign policy, and the 
visit of a liberation movement leader was treated like an important state 
visit from a foreign dignitary, It was during this first phase then that 
the GDR established its international reputation in terms of aiding 
national liberation movements and acting in a radical anti-imperialist 
fashion. 
It is during the second phase of East German involvement in Africa, 
however, that the GDR became the focus of intense international 
attention. 85 Only a few years after the wave of diplomatic 
recognitions in the early seventies had ended the decades of relative 
isolation, events within Africa itself led to a rapid intensification of 
contacts with that continent. The Portuguese empire finally crumbled in 
the mid-seventies and the GDR, like the other socialist countries, was 
now the beneficiary of years of close ties with the anti-Portuguese 
liberation movements, the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique. The 
fact that these countries after independence chose a path of "scientific" 
rather than "African" socialism made relations even closer, and the 
treaties of friendship ratified with them in the late seventies announced 
to the entire world relations of unprecedented intensity between the GDR 
and the developing world. In addition, the unexpected overthrow of 
emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia by a revolutionary group headed by 
Mengistu Haile Miriam led to a rapid intensification of relations between 
Ethiopia and the Soviet Union and its allies. 
Thus, within a few years, the GDR had experienced a transition from 
"supplicant" to a foreign power with considerable influence on the 
continent. The role now played by the GDR was seen by many in the West as 
that of a "surrogate" for Soviet designs,86 This argument, it is argued 
here, it entirely too simplistic for several reasons, It overlooks the 
reality of intensive relations between the GDR and these liberation 
movements throughout the sixties, as well as the growing economic 
interests which the GDR has on the continent, It also rests on the 
dubious assumption that the Soviet Union operates on the basis of a 
"master plan" for world domination, rather than seeing it as a country 
which, despite its revolutionary ideology, responds to situations outside 
its own borders much like the other superpower, the United States, It is 
clearly the case that the Soviet Union takes into account both the United 
States and China in its Third World relations but that in itself does not 
prove a carefully designed program for global domination,87 
Beginning with the eighties, it is argued here, the GDR's relations 
with sub-Saharan Africa entered a third phase, one which has seen the 
loss of much of the optimism for the revolutionary changes in the Third 
World and a much more aggressively self-interested economic policy. As 
was outlined above, the economic situation of socialist Germany as it 
entered its 1981-85 plan required some shifts in policy which affected 
not only relations with the West but also with the South. Increasingly, 
the developing countries came to be looked upon more in terms of their 
markets for industrial goods and suppliers of raw materials rather than 
the revolutionary engines for the global construcion of socialism. Thus 
this current phase is characterized mainly by considerations of economic 
self-interest rather than solidarity in the anti-imperialist struggle. 
Coupled with this shift in domestic priorities has come a certain 
sense of disillusionment on the part of the GDR with the unfolding events 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The inability of the revolutionary governments in 
Africa, particularly in Mozambique, to make significant economic progress 
and to carry out the promises made at independence has led the East 
Germans to a reassessment of the revolutionary possibilities in Africa at 
the present time. While the reasons for this are seen on the one hand in 
the continued strength of imperialism, on the other one now appears to 
appreciate more the backward nature of the forces of production on the 
continent. As was discussed above, the agricultural model advanced by the 
GDR, for example, has proven to be of limited utility for the conditions 
prevailing in Africa at the present time, and the prospects for building 
up industry along the East European model are also extremely slim. 
In many ways, then, the East Germans are now confronted with the 
insufficiency of their own model of development for the specific 
conditions prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa. They are also confronted 
with the inadequacy of their theoretical position concerning the "world 
of national liberation" which actually never had much explanatory value 
for understanding the forces shaping events in that part of the world. 
The position of the GDR, as well as the other socialist countries, was in 
reality an undifferentiated "Third Worldism". It was bound to fail 
because it did not account for the class antagonisms inside the 
developing countries themselves and the ways in which the nascent 
bourgeois classes allied themselves with imperialism against the 
interests of their own peasantry and working classes. Thus the 'natural' 
alliance postulated at the ideological level was never more than wishful 
thinking on the part of the GDR, except in a few cases in which Third 
World leaders decided to opt for a radically anti-capitalist development 
path. 
On the African side a certain sense of disillusionment with the 
ability or willingness of the socialist countries to help overcome 
economic underdevelopment is also taking place. As discussed above, the 
East European countries have been unwilling to use the CMEA as an 
instrument of economic cooperation with the developing countries. 
Mozambique's request for membership in the CMEA was turned down in 1981, 
and it and Angola both have only observer status in that organization. 
Clearly the present members of the CMEA did not feel that they could bear 
the extra burdens imposed by admitting another poor and needy developing 
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country into the group and were either unwilling or unable to make the 
additional sacrifices. This naturally led to a sense of frustration and 
disillusionment in both Angola and Mozambique, especially since both of 
these countries were willing to ally themselves much more closely with 
the socialist countries in the immediate post-independence period. It 
was precisely in anticipation of this level of disillusionment that the 
East Germans apparently voted for the admission of Mozambique into the 
CMEA and were willing to accept the additional economic hardships that 
this admission would have entailed.88 The other CMEA members obviously 
would or could not go along with the East Germans and voted for a 
rejection. 
It is precisely this question of credibility which will haunt the 
GDR's relations with black Africa, at least in the near future. Despite 
its many expressions of solidarity with the continent, in actual 
state-to-state relations this solidarity has been confined mainly to the 
rhetorical level. It has not shown that it is able to provide more than 
the Western countries in terms of aid once independence has been 
achieved, and has proven that in economic terms it will drive as hard a 
bargain as any Western country would. There are some who argue that the 
GDR's policy of "'mutual advantage"' in economic relations does not differ 
in essence from relations between the advanced capitalist countries and 
the South, since the GDR trades at world market prices and the structure 
of trade is very typical for industrialized and developing countries, as 
discussed above. Thus Andre Gunder Frank reaches the conclusion, for 
example, that "'as far as the terms of trade and the internatinal division 
of labor in general goes, we have seen that the 'socialist' countries 
behave no differently from, and sometimes worse than, the imperialist 
ones, except that for reasons of their own they prefer longer-term price 
and delivery arragements, unless they become burdensome."89 
Furthermore, Kunibert Raffer argues that the socialist countries, 
including the GDR, although they have given adament support to the 
developing countries in their call for a new internatinal economic order 
(NIEO), in practice have shown to be every bit as unwilling to give in to 
specific demands of the Third World as have the advanced capitalist 
countries. 90 
This unwillingness to meet concrete demands made by the developing 
countries which would prove to be economically disadvantageous to the GDR 
has several components. Firstly, the GDR emphatically rejects any 
responsibility for the existing division of labor as well as for the 
economic underdevelopment of the South. It thus points to the West as the 
locus of blame and the source from which aid (as a form of reparation) 
should come. As the GDR increases its trade with the developing countries 
and the era of direct colonialization recedes more into history, this 
argument will become subject to growing cynicism, however, since it will 
be increasingly difficult to distinguish between the business practices 
of the East and the West. To argue that one is innocent because one 
follows unfair practices established by others is hardly a convincing 
line of defense. Secondly, as the GDR makes more of its GNP dependent 
upon imports from and exports to the non-CMEA areas, it will subject 
itself increasingly to the pressures of the capitalist world economy. The 
result of this will be not only a deterioration of past attempts at 
integration within the CMEA, since all of the East European countries are 
basically pursuing the same economic strategies vis-a-vis the non-CMEA 
area, but also that this growing level of commodity production for 
exchange on the world market will undermine the very nature of socialist 
production inside the GDR itself. In terms of economic relations with the 
South, this means that the GDR cannot afford to be more concessionary 
than the West in these dealings since it cannot afford to lose its 
current level of competitiveness on the international market. Thirdly, 
as long as the GDR looks to the South not only for raw materials but also 
for markets for its industrialized goods, there will be little incentive 
to change the status quo, political or ideological considerations 
notwithstanding. AJ, Istvan Dobozi, among others, has pointed out 
repeatedly, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe occupy an 
intermediate position in the international division of labor, which means 
that while in East-South trade, the East occupies the traditional 
position of the North (raw materials in exchange for industrial goods), 
while in East-West trade, the East becomes the supplier of raw materials 
and thus holds the traditional "South" position.91 Thus the GDR is 
locked into the operations of the global economy and is subject to the 
same law of value. To expect it to be able to act more in line with its 
socialist ideology would be to ignore the fundamental fact of its 
dependence on the capitalist world economy, which thus is able to shape 
both its political and economic options.93 
In many ways, then, it is argued that the second phase of 
interaction was ultimately atypical for the nature of relations with 
sub-Saharan Africa and was more of a response to events there than part 
of a deliberate East German policy. As the GDR has gained the 
international diplomatic recognition it sought after throughout the 
fifties and sixties, it has become much more of a status quo power in the 
world, willing to play the game of international relations more or less 
by the established rules. Thus the current third phase will characterize 
relations between the GDR and sub-Saharan Africa in the years to come. 
The harsh reality is that the GDR cannot afford any more Mozambiques, 
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